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Introduction
Toynbee’s (1951) observation that disintegrating civilizations 
are consistently characterized by a high degree of standard-
ization and uniformity is a provocative one in an era where 
organizational standards and norms are ubiquitous (Brunsson 
& Jacobsson, 2000). From an organizational perspective, 
several scholars subscribe to a similar view, expressing con-
cern over excessively homogenized and standardized orga-
nizations and the ramifications thereof (Hodgson & Cicmil, 
2007; Jones, Levesque, & Masuda, 2003). In consequence, 
although this analysis is not aimed at the level of entire civi-
lizations, I suggest that a similar phenomenon can operate 
within organizations as well.
One contemporary manifestation of the widespread exis-
tence of standards and norms in organizations pertains to the 
commodification of emotions at work. This phenomenon has 
been studied intensely in recent years (Fineman, 2000; 
Lindebaum, 2009). Here, emotional exchanges are appropri-
ated and shaped by the organization to serve its interests; 
they are turned into manageable and exchangeable resources 
that can be traded, like any other currency or commodity, 
with a view to make it gain from the exchange (Bolton & 
Boyd, 2003). Such a view may be particularly pertinent in 
light of the increasing number of individuals working in the 
service industry (Ashkanasy, Härtel, & Daus, 2002), where 
the ability to convey pleasant emotions is of paramount 
importance on economic grounds (e.g., Illouz, 2007). Thus, 
it is often suggested that survival in service organizations is 
considerably dependent on the successful presentation of 
emotional displays expected by clients and customers 
(Wasserman, Rafaeli, & Kluger, 2000). Yet, these expecta-
tions may pose difficulties for individuals. Schor (2006) 
goes as far as to suggest that, because jobs are increasingly 
scarce, “the norms for succeeding in them are harder and 
harder to sustain for individuals” (p. 46).
Like several authors before (Illouz, 2007; Mestrović, 
1999), I argue that the expression of emotions is increasingly 
cast into a simplified mold, reflecting the restricted range of 
those emotions whose display is desired by the organization. 
Empirical evidence to this effect is accumulating (Kunda & 
van Maanen, 1999; Martin, Knopoff, & Beckman, 2000). In 
fact, Fineman (2001) goes as far as to describe the scale of 
this organizational intervention as “grand” (p. 234). I view 
this development of emotional convergence with consider-
able concern due to its infringement on individual identity 
and well-being, let alone the loss of individual discretion and 
autonomy. Indeed, social norms serve crucial purposes in 
facilitating human interaction (Forgas, 1985), but there is a 
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Abstract
In this analysis, I associate the commodification of emotions at work with an increasingly imposed standardization as far as 
emotional displays are concerned. I refer to this process as a form of emotional convergence operating within organizations. 
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tipping point where they may also turn dysfunctional. That 
is, there may be a curvilinear effect in the relationship between 
individual interests and social norms. Therefore, I do not 
suggest that simply asking service workers to be polite and 
helpful actually damages them emotionally in the short run. 
What is critical to the argument is a pronounced need to dis-
play organizationally prescribed emotions over a long period 
of time. Differentiating between heath outcomes in the 
short and long run has received scholarly attention of late 
(Lawrence, Troth, Jordan, & Collins, 2011).
Curiously, scholars have also zealously examined the 
construct of emotional intelligence (EI), in terms of its impli-
cations for organizational outcomes, such as performance 
(Cartwright & Pappas, 2008), and individual well-being 
(Lindebaum, 2009). Mayer and Salovey (1997) define EI as 
the “ability to perceive accurately, appraise, and express 
emotion; the ability to access and/or generate feelings when 
they facilitate thought; the ability to understand emotion and 
emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to 
promote emotional and intellectual growth” (p. 10, italics 
added for emphasis). More recently, they explicitly denoted 
EI as a human ability (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008). 
Seeing that emotions are engagements with the world 
(Solomon, 1993) that provide crucial action readiness to 
safeguard the survival of individuals (Darwin, 1872/1999), 
I take the reference to emotional and intellectual growth in 
the above definition to imply an emotional divergence that 
individuals harness in managing their daily lives. This diver-
gent notion appears plausible given that the EI construct sig-
nificantly advanced on the critique that the “mass suppression 
of emotion throughout the civilized world has stifled our 
growth emotionally” (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2000, p. 396). 
In turn, being emotionally intelligent implies not only that 
one can draw on a wide range of emotions to help individuals 
engender multiple alternatives to one and the same problem 
(George, 2000), but also that one possesses the adaptive abil-
ity to manage negative emotions and cognitions success-
fully. Such ability has been linked to better health outcomes 
(Salovey, Bedell, Detweiler, & Mayer, 1999). Under this 
formulation, the presence of emotions is acknowledged as 
the crucial telltale signs they are; they convey meaning about 
relationships (Schwarz & Clore, 1983).
Although the notions of emotional convergence (as repre-
sented by the phenomenon of commodified emotions) and 
divergence (as represented by EI) have not been explicitly 
and jointly discussed in the literature, it is the first aim of 
this analysis to graphically draw out the tension between 
these strands. Specifically, this entails that EI scholars should 
heed this tension more carefully in their attempts to advance 
theory as well as design and test empirical studies. However, 
I should explicitly point out that there is some definitional 
ambiguity in the reference to emotional and intellectual 
growth, as the definition does not clarify whether it concerns 
growth in socially sanctioned terms or intrapersonal growth. 
In a similar vein, although nonconformity may have several 
roots (e.g., value incongruence) in a world of increasing 
complexity, I suggest that EI can influence the emergence 
of it when emotions are considered the very valuable 
resources through which organizational ends are achieved 
(Fineman, 2000; Illouz, 2007). This may be due to EI rep-
resenting an individual’s capacity to process emotional 
data (Mayer et al., 2008).
This study can be located alongside a significant corpus 
of research that scrutinizes the study of organizational culture 
as a guise for “colonizing” individual emotions (see Gabriel, 
1999a; Willmott, 1993). For instance, Willmott (1993) 
evaluates research on organizational culture. He draws 
attention to how it is engineered to promote employee com-
mitment to a “monolithic structure of feeling and thought” (p. 
517) as a tool of normative control. A related phenomenon 
in the context of organizational cultures that seek to 
manipulate individual emotions stems from Fineman’s 
(2000) work concerning the commodification of emotions, 
although his work is considerably more attuned to emotions 
per se as a resource that possesses exchange value. Note, 
however, that commodified emotions and normative control 
are two distinct phenomena. The former constitutes an exter-
nal influence force (i.e., emotions possess a market and 
exchange value). It is a control mechanism inherent in the 
labor process. Normative control, by contrast, is an internal 
control mechanism, defined as “the attempt to elicit and 
direct the required efforts of member by controlling the 
underlying experiences, thoughts, and feelings that guide 
their actions” (Kunda, 1992, pp. 11-12). Despite their differ-
ent nature, both phenomena have in common that they imply 
a manipulation of individual emotions for the benefit of the 
organization.
As a whole, the commonalty of these studies is such 
that they provide accounts for, and highlight ramifications 
of, the commodification of emotions at work. Whereas 
these studies contain the occasional reference to individual 
resistance, they do not specify in detail the underlying pro-
cesses that foster it. Drawing on the construct of EI enables 
the specification of rationales and contingencies that 
potentially contribute to this resistance, as manifest in the 
emergence of nonconforming organizational actors. Some 
scholars, recently, have drawn attention to this possibility, 
noting that
since emotions penetrate individual cognitive pro-
cesses and social relationships . . ., it seems plausible 
to us to suggest that . . . power relations [and] resis-
tance tendencies to emotional control within organisa-
tions . . . all constitute intriguing variables [in the study 
of EI in organizations]. (Lindebaum & Cartwright, 
2011, p. 286)
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Thus, I propose that EI may help explain why individuals 
sometimes resist organizational demands for emotional con-
formity (Bolton & Boyd, 2003; Wray-Bliss, 2001). Therefore, 
the second contribution of this analysis rests with these ratio-
nales and contingencies leading to nonconforming behavior. 
For the sake of clarity and consistency, I refer to the com-
modification of emotions in the remainder of this article to 
denote the standardized outcomes of organizational cultures.
The third contribution flows from the specification of the 
aforementioned rationales and contingencies. Specifically, it 
enables the exploration of strategies emotionally intelligent 
individuals potentially embark on the moment they feel and 
realize the impact of organizational endeavors to commodify 
emotions. Far from using crude and transparent practices, 
organizations seeking to commodify emotions or influence 
behavior often harness more subtle approaches to accom-
plish it (Fleming & Sturdy, 2011). Of note, I do not suggest 
that this is likely to occur over a short period of time, but is 
rather accumulating in the long run. Also, I do not suggest 
that this happens across occupations, but rather in those that 
have strict role prescriptions, such as service workers 
or project managers in construction (Hochschild, 1983; 
Lindebaum & Fielden, 2011).
In addressing these gaps in the literature, this analysis 
constitutes a significant contribution to theory development. 
As such, I hope it instigates more finely grained debates in 
the field and serves organizational behavior scholars and 
psychologists as a potent springboard for future empirical 
testing.
The article unfolds alongside the following main sections. 
First, I briefly discuss organizational standards and norms, 
highlighting their differences and commonalities. Second, I 
extend their implications to the realm of commodified emo-
tions at work. Third, I appraise the construct EI and its impli-
cations for organizations and individuals. Fourth, I draw on 
a small number of empirical studies to outline why I deem 
high EI individuals as potential organizational nonconform-
ists. Note, however, that a speculative hint remains because 
only now theoretical and empirical research emerges that 
examines EI as a catalyst for nonconformity or resistance 
(e.g., Fambrough & Hart, 2008; Winkel, Wyland, Shaffer, 
& Clason, 2011). In the discussion, I synthesize the article in 
the form of two conflicting templates and one testable dia-
gram. Together, they highlight the interaction between the 
individual and organizations.
Organizational Standards and 
Norms
Standards and norms, though sometimes used interchange-
ably, can have rather distinct connotations. Typically, stan-
dards are described as inherently inert and multidimensional, 
as “a set of agreed-upon rules for the production of (textual 
or material) objects,” spanning “more than one community 
of practise . . . deployed in making things work together over 
distance and heterogeneous metrics” (Bowker & Starr, 1999, 
pp. 13-14). Thus, they typically intend to make actions com-
parable over time and space and can readily be combined 
with other resources. One such resource pertains to the emo-
tions of individuals, which are appreciably appropriated and 
commodified in contemporary organizations.
Social norms, in contrast, which used to be rarely found in 
written form (Gabriel, 1999b), are often defined as general-
ized expectations about behaviors that are internalized in the 
course of socialization (Coleman, 1990). Though multifac-
eted, norms have a pronounced behavioral dimension and 
are subject to, and influenced by, the social milieu in which 
they are negotiated, such as the dress code of employees in 
organizations. Also, social norms are plastic and susceptible 
to change, and that is particularly so with regard to emotions 
(Stearns & Stearns, 1985). As Clarke and Fineman (2009) 
discuss, these social norms also impinge on individual 
behavior within organizations (i.e., How does the moral fab-
ric of society affect the behavior of the manager?).
Brunsson and Jacobsson (2000) note that standards and 
norms can be further differentiated by virtue of the explicit 
and evident sources of the former, which are difficult to pin-
point for the latter. The implicit nature of norms is, inter alia, 
reflected in how individuals are socialized into the culture of 
an organization (e.g., inviting new employees to join the 
after-work drinks ritual). However, some scholars suggest 
that norms can also be rather explicit in nature, as reflected 
in recruitment strategies and job descriptions (Ashkanasy & 
Daus, 2002). Recent examples include the fast-food chain 
McDonalds (see http://www.mcdonalds.co.uk/people/ 
join-the-team/join-the-team.shtml—Retrieved 15 August 
2011). Similarly, Fineman (2001) provides a vivid example 
of what kind of emotional display is expected by McDonalds’ 
employees, reciting a conversation between a young male 
assistant manager and a female employee. Furthermore, the 
Times Higher Education magazine recently reported the case 
of Leeds University (United Kingdom), where guidelines 
were issued exhorting members of staff to write with more 
wit. The paper also referred to a set of personality traits to 
“guide how we talk and write for the university,” including 
being straightforward, friendly, imaginative, and confident. 
More to the point, it states that “life—yours, your reader’s 
and the university’s—will be a lot richer for it” (Newman, 
2010, p. 7). The above examples underpin that, irrespective 
of their explicit or implicit nature, standards and norms are 
instruments of control within organizations (Brunsson & 
Jacobsson, 2000).
In practical terms, the indoctrinal momentum of some 
organizational norms can be so immense that individuals 
readily experience shame, anxiety, or guilt when they are 
violated (van Maanen, 1999). These socially constructed 
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emotions have a tight grip on the behavioral repertoire indi-
viduals draw from and are often central to social control in 
organizations and societies (Scheff, 1997). Thus, despite 
their occasional heterogeneous character and distinct termi-
nology, standards and norms can be identical in their impli-
cations for organizations and individuals.
Commodified Emotions
One manifestation of these implications can be traced to the 
study of emotions in organizations. This topic has been 
intensely studied as the normalizing mechanism to secure 
control over, and compliance with, organizational processes 
(Barsade & Gibson, 2007; Caruso & Salovey, 2004). Some 
organizations actively foster an atmosphere where employees 
share affective behavioral cues, so as to sustain a common 
emotional style (Kelly & Barsade, 2001). For instance, indi-
viduals may perform better when they are committed to col-
lective goals whose ideals they honor. Not surprisingly, 
Bolton and Boyd (2003) note that this shaping and manipu-
lating of employees’ emotions is firmly tied to the notion of 
competitive advantage. In line with this view, several studies 
suggest that control over individuals can best be exercised 
by shaping their feelings, thoughts, and behaviors (Barley & 
Kunda, 1992). Krishnamurti (1992) underlines these findings 
elegantly, arguing that many organizations are “after the 
mind of man—after in the sense of wanting to capture it, 
shape it to a certain pattern” (p. 32, italics in original). Such 
intentionality may be more distinct and explicit in some 
organizations compared with others. Yet, some commenta-
tors discern an increasing intentionality on the part of orga-
nizations (Alvesson & Willmott, 2002).
One prominent control mechanism inherent in the labor 
process is referred to as the commodification of emotions 
(e.g., Fineman, 2000). That is, emotions are converted into 
manageable and exchangeable resources or “things,” capa-
ble of being monitored and manipulated according to the dic-
tates of the market (Boden & Williams, 2002), as is known 
in the context of emotional labor. Hochschild (1983) defines 
it as “the management of feelings to create a publicly observ-
able facial and bodily display” such that “emotional labor is 
sold for a wage and therefore has exchange value” (p. 7). 
Here, it is imperative for individuals to display, and some-
times really feel, specific emotions in exchange for remuner-
ation. Failure to align displayed and felt emotions may lead to 
emotional dissonance, which refers to the structural discrep-
ancy between the two (Heuven & Bakker, 2003).
Seen in this light, I argue that there is a growing trend in 
organizations to demand in writing specific behavioral epi-
sodes that feature specific emotional displays by employees, 
as the examples above underline. Oftentimes, so-called cor-
porate culture handbooks serve as transmitters to get the 
message across to employees (Kunda, 1992). Thus, a climate 
of emotional standardization is instilled, where emotions 
considered inappropriate by the organization are suppressed 
by individuals, thereby often leading to emotional exhaus-
tion and burnout (Kruml & Geddes, 2000; Tracy, 2000). The 
underlying process may range from exerting peer pressure to 
instilling fear of losing one’s job if the role prescriptions are 
violated (Fineman & Sturdy, 1999). Although this may not 
necessarily initiate the wholesale demise of organizations, 
absence from work due to ill health (e.g., stress and burnout) 
as well as high turnover clearly have a negative impact on 
organizations in the long run (Ashkanasy & Cooper, 2008; 
Kumar Mishra & Bhatnagar, 2010; Lawrence, 2008). In 
contrast, emotions deemed appropriate are cast into a limited 
and simplified mold, reflecting the emotional and behavioral 
standards desired by organizations (Bolton, 2009). Under 
this formulation, the view that the suppression of emotions is 
a voluntary act, occurring when individuals choose not to 
act on certain stimuli (Beckett, 2002), may not hold. This, in 
turn, can lead to a loss of individual autonomy and discre-
tion, as well as the freedom of how to feel, yielding a work-
force pool of seemingly indistinguishable individuals 
(see appendix). The result may well be in congruence with 
what the Social Identity Theory (Hogg & Terry, 2001) char-
acterizes as “depersonalization.” The principal consequence 
thereof is such that individuals succumb their own self or 
identity to a group social categorization, the result often 
being that they feel depersonalized from their own values 
(Jones et al., 2003). Note, however, that there may be instances 
where individuals do not resist such endeavors, simply 
because they are willing to express their emotions within 
organizationally appropriate ranges that they deem fit as well 
(Schneider, 1987). Fleming and Sturdy (2009) examine such 
willingness in the context of neonormative control studies 
and suggested that management now frequently exhorts 
individuals “just to be yourself” or to “have fun at work.” 
Underlying these maxims are appeals to feeling existentially 
empowered by exposing oneself, especially one’s personal-
ity and preferences, to the organization. From this point of 
view, an individual’s emotions are important, but only as 
long as they serve organizational goals (Fineman, 1997). 
However, several commentators concur that this also con-
stitutes a form of control, one that raises questions about 
the meaning of authenticity at work (e.g., Fleming & 
Sturdy, 2009).
For the purpose of this analysis, however, I suggest that 
not to have the choice of how to feel as we are naturally 
inclined to implies that we cannot be who we naturally are. 
Durkheim (1915) lucidly expounds this point, noting that
mourning is not a natural movement of private feel-
ings wounded by a cruel loss; it is a duty imposed by 
the group. One weeps, not simply because he is sad, 
but because he is forced to weep. It is a ritual attitude 
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he is forced to adopt out of respect from custom, but 
which is, in a large measure, independent of his affective 
state. (p. 397)
Camus’s (1982) The Outsider starkly depicts how society 
retaliates if one does not mourn about the loss of a loved one. 
The character in Camus’s novel refuses to lie about his true 
feelings (i.e., he does not experience regret after his mother 
dies to the extent others consider it “normal”). Thus, he 
remains true to himself, albeit he perishes as a result of it. 
These examples underscore the intimate link between being 
forced to comply with social expectations, and the repercus-
sions for how one might, and is allowed to, feel. In other 
words, the notion of emotional convergence can be consid-
ered as a sophisticated incursion into individual identity, as 
emotions are central to the formation thereof (Damasio, 
2000). I elaborate this point in a later section of this article. 
Interestingly, while organizations may be adamant in demand-
ing the adoption of certain core values (i.e., “to feel great”) 
and the corresponding display of organization-friendly 
emotions, it is often an open question whether they assist 
individuals to cope with these demands.
The notion of emotional standardization, beyond the tip-
ping point where they can turn dysfunctional, in many con-
temporary organizations is difficult to reconcile with the 
human potential to evolve (Krishnamurti & Anderson, 1991; 
Rogers, 1977). It, too, is a sharp reminder of Toynbee’s (1951) 
hortatory observation that standardization tends to instigate 
the decline of social groups as opposed to the growth thereof. 
Sale (1980) concurs, contending that “diversity is the rule of 
human life, not simplicity: the human animal has succeeded 
because it has been able to diversify, not specialise” (p. 403). 
In this respect, we should be reminded that emotions did not 
lead to our demise. Quite the reverse, emotions are the prod-
uct of our evolution; they are crucial action tendencies to 
ensure the survival of individuals (Darwin, 1872/1999).
EI
Combining the increasing convergence between organiza-
tional standards and norms as a result of commodified emo-
tions at work opens up an intriguing new vista for scholars 
in organizational behavior and psychology, especially through 
the lens of EI. In this article, I draw on the ability model of 
EI, as defined prior. The ability model explicitly centers on 
a set of emotional abilities assessed via tests of maximum 
performance representing an individual’s ability to process 
emotion-laden information (Mayer & Salovey, 1997) that 
are partly determined by basic information processes in the 
brain (Reis et al., 2007). As I am interested in the emotional 
and intellectual growth of individuals, the choice of ability 
EI as a framework of analysis is self-explanatory. I con-
strue the maximum performance in processing emotion-laden 
information in the spirit of Krishnamurti’s (1992) notion of 
seriousness, which he conceives as the courage to pursue 
thoughts to the very end, irrespective of the (perhaps painful) 
consequences that such inquiring may lead to. Because emo-
tions are data about us, the pursuit of a thought to the very 
end can be a vehicle to foster the aforementioned emotional 
divergence.
Briefly, the ability model of EI implicates four branches, 
which are hierarchically ordered. First, the perception of 
emotions pertains to perceiving emotion in the self and others, 
using cues derived from facial expressions, voices, or bodily 
movements (Caruso & Salovey, 2004). Second, individuals 
can use emotions to facilitate thought. That is, positive 
moods can enhance creativity, integrative thinking, and induc-
tive reasoning, whereas negative moods impel one toward 
attention to detail, exposure of errors and problems, as well 
as thorough information processing (George, 2000). Third, EI 
involves the capacity to understand emotions. That is, the 
causes and consequences of emotions, how they change over 
time, and how to put all this into language (Caruso & Salovey, 
2004). Last, EI also implies the efficient regulation of emotions 
in the self and others in emotionally and socially challenging 
situations (Wranik, Feldman-Barrett, & Salovey, 2006).
In recent years, a groundswell of scientific interest revolved 
around the concept of EI (Côté & Miners, 2006; Lindebaum, 
2009). EI has been depicted as a vital ingredient for function-
ing interpersonal relationships (Caruso & Salovey, 2004), 
and those high in EI are said to be better able to handle social 
relationships (Lopes et al., 2004). There is also evidence to 
suggest that EI has positive implications for individual per-
formance at work (Côté & Miners, 2006). Thus, many 
writers are quick to pinpoint that the business case for EI is 
“compelling” (Goleman, 1998). By now, a mushrooming 
“EI training” industry has evolved to help organizations 
tap into this supposedly indispensable construct 
(Kunnanatt, 2004).
Unfortunately, many proponents of the EI concept, in the 
pop psychology as well as in the scientific camp, have over-
looked one crucially important possibility; individuals high 
in EI may act against, or seek to defend themselves from, the 
standardizing or normalizing of emotions at work. The pos-
sibility of such conflict, and the manifestation of high EI indi-
viduals as nonconformists, has been an enduring blind spot in 
the extant literature, and scholars have rarely attended to this 
problem. More to the point, Hughes (2005) appears to be one 
of the very few writers who explicitly states that EI may also 
“open up new possibilities for resistant worker agency since 
. . . EI at once combines greater emotional regulation with 
greater discretion over the display and management of emo-
tions” (p. 619). Underlying this possibility may be the real-
ization that continuous exposure to these constraints, no 
matter how subtle they might be, has detrimental implica-
tions for their health and integrity, such as depersonalization, 
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burnout, and exhaustion (Foster & Hoggett, 1999; Hochschild, 
1983; Tracy, 2000). Such constraints are also at variance 
with the adaptive characteristic of emotions (Keltner & 
Haidt, 1999). Interestingly, although one might suggest that 
high EI individuals may choose to conform to organizational 
norms to safeguard their well-being (e.g., for financial rea-
sons), the notion of emotional convergence ultimately may 
entail negative consequences for their well-being. For 
instance, following Krishnamurti’s (1992) notion of serious-
ness, an individual may realize that, even though nonconfor-
mity may lead to group exclusion (e.g., because one does not 
join the obligatory after-work drinks), it nevertheless has 
enormous benefits for the individual’s well-being. Crucially, 
EI has been shown to consistently predict positive health 
outcomes (Martins, Ramalho, & Morin, 2010). As such, my 
interest rests with the possibility of high EI individuals 
as nonconformists. This interest builds on theoretical 
(Fambrough & Hart, 2008; Lindebaum, 2009) and empirical 
studies linking EI to deviant behaviors. For instance, studies 
suggest that ability EI is positively related to individually 
and organizationally focused deviant behaviors (Winkel et 
al., 2011). Thus, although some conjecture resides in my 
argument, there is an emerging body of research that associ-
ates EI with negative consequences for organizations. Like 
other scholars (see Bakan, 1969; Popper, 2004), I feel thus 
encouraged to pursue possibility and conjecture (i.e., Can it 
work?) over proof and prediction (i.e., Is it true?). Below, I 
detail several rationales why an emotionally intelligent indi-
vidual potentially falls into the nonconformist category.
Emotionally Intelligent Individuals 
as Nonconformists
In extending prior research associating deviant behavior 
with EI (Winkel et al., 2011), I propose that there are at least 
four potent rationales why an emotionally intelligent indi-
vidual potentially engages in nonconformist behavior. First, 
as suggested earlier, emotions are key to the formation of 
individual identity and function in two important ways as the 
“glue” for it. For one thing, they attract the self to new expe-
riences due to the seeking out and recognizing of familiar or 
meaningful signatures. For another, they link disparate expe-
riences that share emotional information, instilling mean-
ing and value to individual experiences (Haviland-Jones & 
Kahlbaugh, 2000). Prolonged exposure to, or involvement 
with, organizational environments that require employees 
to “genuinely feel” happy, fine, upbeat, and positive about 
the service or product may render it difficult for them to 
switch off these corporate mantras at the end of the working 
day (Fineman, 2001). In this respect, Bolton (2009) reads 
Hochschild’s work on emotional labor as essentially 
concerning a struggle over identity. Thus, the internalized 
work role is making inroads into the privacy of employees, 
constituting a sophisticated form of ontological control 
(Steiner, 2001). In other words, they sacrifice a part of their 
selves for the wealth of another entity, which fits closely 
with Durkheim’s (1897/1952) conception of alienation. A 
recent study that examined emotional dissonance and burn-
out in a sample of flight attendances underscores this argu-
ment. One respondent, rather poignantly, lamented that at 
work “one is very much managed on being cheerful, being 
sociable, being kind and smiling” and that he or she “had the 
feeling of not controlling [his/her] own character any longer 
. . . I had the feeling that I had lost my own feelings” 
(Heuven & Bakker, 2003, p. 93).
Second, empirical studies show that not being able to 
freely express one’s own emotions is associated with nega-
tive physiological costs, such as increased blood pressure and 
heart rate (Butler et al., 2003). Being unable to express truly 
felt emotions can be a direct result of commodified emotions, 
which oftentimes serves as a control mechanism to secure 
compliance with organizational interests, as mentioned ear-
lier. Yet, this control is also a double-edged sword if it is 
enforced by a stringent regime of order, leaving individuals 
with the compulsion to comply. The result is often that 
individuals experience tensions, anxiety, and nervousness 
(Wieland-Burston, 1992). Lawrence (2008) adds that the sup-
pression of intense negative emotions is accountable for 
inducing toxic events in individuals, such as depression and 
low life satisfaction and well-being. After all, we may suc-
cessfully suppress emotions, but that does not alleviate 
the subjective experience thereof. Lawrence’s observation 
appears particularly suitable for extension into the study of 
emotional labor, especially the aspect of emotional disso-
nance. Several empirical studies document a consistent asso-
ciation between emotional dissonance and psychological 
strain (Zapf, 2002). Crucially, accumulating these physiolog-
ical and psychological costs over time appears incongruent 
with EI theory, for the simple reason that it would compro-
mise the individual’s well-being and integrity (Lindebaum, 
2009). Note that meta-analytic evidence consistently links EI 
to positive health outcomes (Martins et al., 2010).
Third, there are also costs accruing in terms of quality of 
interpersonal relationships at work. When we suppress emo-
tions, we fail to send the right signals about us, thus render-
ing it difficult for others to meet our true needs (Caruso & 
Salovey, 2004). Not surprisingly, then, the suppression of 
emotions has been consistently linked to inhibitions in form-
ing relationships and rapport with others (see Butler & Gross, 
2009, for a review). Particularly at work, performance is often 
contingent on the support, advice, and access to resources pro-
vided by others (Kelley & Caplan, 1993). In consequence, 
the quality of social interactions plays a decisive role in 
determining whether one can draw on such a supportive 
network at work. Of note, Butler and Gross (2009) sum-
marize the emotion regulation literature by suggesting that 
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the suppression of emotions has implications on an individ-
ual level (e.g., psychological strain) and social level (i.e., 
inhibition in forming relationships), thus linking the second 
and third rationale discussed above.
Fourth, emotions embrace a vital function in supporting 
memory (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000). When emo-
tions are suppressed, individuals tend to end up remembering 
less information by virtue of the consumptive nature of self-
regulatory activities (Baumeister, Muraven, & Tice, 2000). In 
consequence, an individual’s heuristic ability to draw on a 
wider range of emotional experience to engender the best 
course of action is greatly impaired.
Taken together, I suggest that these rationales provide a 
plausible impetus for individuals high in EI to attempt safe-
guarding their identity, well-being, and integrity in emotion-
ally commodifying organizations. Conceivably, they may do 
so in a deterministic fashion, for they are more likely to have 
accurate insights into their true needs (i.e., perception of emo-
tion), enabling them to arrive at decisions that are in their best 
interest—as opposed to group interests. Damasio (2000) ele-
gantly captures the interplay between individual and social 
influences, suggesting that,
Notwithstanding the reality that learning and culture 
alter the expression of emotions, . . . emotions are 
biologically determined processes, depending on 
innately set brain devices, laid down by a long evolu-
tionary history. (p. 51)
Contrasting Parkinson’s (1996) work (i.e., “Emotions are 
social”) and Seneca’s thoughts explicates this point. The for-
mer suggests that social relationships, including issues of 
social conformity, are the most common cause of emo-
tions, whereas the latter argues that the “cause of our emo-
tion is beyond our power, but whether a cause affects us is 
not” (in Solomon, 2003, p. 233). Seneca’s thoughts are 
especially pertinent in light of this study’s focus on EI and 
nonconformity in organizations because the accurate per-
ception of emotion in the self and others, as well as the 
adaptive regulation of emotions, are key components of EI 
theory. One may not be immune to the cause of emotions, 
but being emotionally intelligent can imply that one may not 
act on it. So the outcome is likely to be an emotionally 
mindful and adept individual, as opposed to individuals who 
are emotionally inept as a result of commodified emotions 
(Bolton & Boyd, 2003).
In the wider context of organizational behavior studies, 
my assumption of high EI individuals as nonconformists fits 
closely with Schein’s (1968) classical work on socialization 
processes in organizations. He proposes that individuals may 
engage in one of three distinctive behavioral responses to 
these processes. They may either (a) conform to it (i.e., 
acceptance of organization’s culture and norms), (b) rebel 
against it (i.e., rejection of organization’s culture and norms), 
or (c) engage in creative individualism (i.e., acceptance or 
rejection of organization’s culture and norms in a selective 
fashion, adapting it to his or her characteristics). Following 
from the above, it appears sensible to propose that individuals 
high in EI are rather unlikely to conform to these norms. 
Whether they simply reject these norms and engage in non-
conformist behavior or perhaps opt for creative individualism 
seems to depend on the presence of two contingencies: 
(a) their perception of alternatives and (b) their goals, both 
of which influence the resultant choices they perform.
Studies in the domain of negotiations underpin the former 
point. For instance, individuals’ perception of their choices 
and alternatives considerably affects concession making. 
The better the perceived alternatives, the lower the depen-
dence on the counterpart, and the lower the concessions ren-
dered (Sinaceur & Tiedens, 2006). In actual fact, individuals’ 
perception of their alternatives may impinge on their behav-
ior more strongly then any other type of information (White, 
Valley, Bazerman, Neale, & Peck, 1994). By extension, high 
EI individuals, in understanding the negative consequences 
of commodified emotions on them, may perceive that their 
well-being and psychological health are sacrosanct and that 
there are alternatives to the current organization they work 
for. To the extent they perceive these behavioral alternatives 
within their job prescriptions, they may engage in creative 
individualism. Failing that, they may seek employment else-
where. Thus, it is conceivable that absenteeism and turnover 
may be a proxy index of organizational decline impelled by 
those individuals who turn their backs to organizations they 
perceive to be emotionally commodifying. It shall be under-
stood, however, that this argumentation must be interpreted 
with the current economic climate in mind, where unem-
ployment is rising (National Office of Statistics, 2009).
The second intrinsic factor as to whether individuals leave 
or stay on the job concerns the goals they pursue. Lindebaum 
(2009), for instance, argues that EI individuals are more 
likely to center on their well-being in conjunction with intrin-
sically rewarding occupations (e.g., musicians, gardeners, 
care assistants—see Rose, 2003) rather than being driven by 
extrinsic motivation, which tends to engender an environ-
ment of compliance and defiance (Kouzes & Posner, 2002). 
By the same token, Kasser and Ryan (1993) note that well-
being was most distinct for individuals who embraced intrinsi-
cally orientated goals, such as personal growth or community 
contributions. Of note, scholars identified a decline in worker 
satisfaction with the intrinsic domains of their work (Green, 
2011), as well as in the exercise of discretion and autonomy 
as part of one’s job (Green & Tsitsianis, 2005).
The aforementioned arguments permit to outline the char-
acteristics of an emotionally intelligent individual within an 
organizational context. Rather than mere acceptance of being 
subject to the commodification of emotions at work (i.e., 
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social pressures), I conceive of emotionally intelligent 
individuals as those characters who are more likely to seek 
intrinsically rewarding jobs embedded in organizational 
environments that are relatively low in emotional commodi-
fication. They may also have awareness of the choices avail-
able to them, so as to orchestrate alternatives should external 
conformity pressures increase and become unfavorable to 
their well-being and integrity over a long period of time. To 
a certain degree, this may implicate that they engage in cre-
ative individualism. Crucially, I do not suggest that these 
individuals are lone operators. Instead, within their creative 
individualism, they may derive some satisfaction from the 
interaction with others at work. Yet, concurrently, individu-
als high in EI are also more likely to perceive the tipping 
where this is no longer feasible, thus converting into noncon-
formists and leaving the organization in quest of alternatives. 
Even a small number of individuals would suffice to falsify 
the null hypothesis that high individual EI does not play any 
role in the emergence of resistant behaviors, thus running 
counter to the all-pervasive maxim that high individual EI is 
synonymous with positive outcomes for the organization.
Discussion
In this article, I sought to challenge and expand existing 
theory concerning the commodification of emotions and the 
exclusively positive role of EI at work, despite the fact that 
past research suggested the utility of the latter in organiza-
tional behavior studies. I specified four rationales and two 
contingencies that can inform the behavior of individuals 
high in EI as to what kind of strategy they pursue in emotion-
ally commodifying organizations. Following Turner’s (1988) 
observation that scholars often apologize for a biased neglect 
of the individuals’ effect on organizations and society, I 
proposed that EI may be a worthy construct to consider. 
Applying Schein’s (1968) response categories to organiza-
tional socialization processes, I proposed that individuals 
high in EI are unlikely to emerge as organizational conform-
ists based on the rationales discussed, and that their deci-
sion as to whether to engage in resistance (i.e., rejecting the 
organizational norm of commodified emotions) or creative 
individualism (i.e., the ability to selectively accept or reject 
organizational norms) is strongly contingent on their per-
ceived alternatives and goals. To recapitulate, the perception 
of alternatives and individual goals appear paramount in 
determining the resultant behavioral choices individuals 
perform. This fits closely with Turner’s argument that indi-
vidual behavior plays an important role in the “maintenance, 
modification or disruption of society” (p. 1) and, by exten-
sion, organizations as well. In so doing, I expanded influen-
tial previous debates that identified and documented the 
commodification of emotions at work and its relation to the 
construct of EI (e.g., Fineman, 2000).
Based on this analysis, it is now apparent that scholars 
need to be much more appreciative of the potential conflict 
between these two research strands. In other words, future 
research should take into account simultaneously the notion 
of emotional convergence, as encapsulated under the 
umbrella of commodified emotions, and the notion of emo-
tional divergence, as represented by the EI construct. In 
terms of the former, I expressed concern about the increas-
ing similarity between organizational standards and norms 
in terms of their implications as control mechanism to serve 
organizational interests. As to the latter, I outlined several 
rationales and contingencies concerning the potential of indi-
viduals high in EI as nonconformist. The analysis is synthe-
sized in Figures 1a and 1b.
Specifically, Figure 1a emphasizes the convergent conse-
quences of normalized and commodified emotions and how 
such tendency constitutes a considerable contrast with the 
evolutionary significance of emotions. Solomon (2003) 
argues along similar lines when he criticizes the reduction of 
emotional behavior through the development of stereotypi-
cal responses, a tendency he regards as “pathological” 
(p. 13). Eventually, this convergence may render Toynbee’s 
caution perhaps more realistic for organizations. As discussed 
above, high turnover and absence from work due to ill health 
may serve as a proxy measure thereof. This could also lead to 
organizations experiencing recruitment problems in the long 
run, for the way they treat employees is increasingly seen as 
“toxic” (Lawrence, 2008). Hence, I suggest that the commod-
ification of emotions at work can create fertile soil for organi-
zational inertia or demise—the moment individuals feel and 
realize the consequences thereof. It would be intriguing to 
examine the tipping point where economic advantages of 
commodified emotions are equalized, perhaps surpassed, by 
the economic disadvantages associated with absenteeism, 
high turnover, and recruitment problems.
At this juncture, it is pivotal to revert back to the introduc-
tion, and explicate why I deem some social norms dysfunc-
tional, despite some scholars suggesting that any human 
group can only exist due to the conformity to certain norms 
(Forgas, 1985). On a more generic level, the dysfunction of 
social norms is evident in the seminal experiment by Asch 
(1956), who aimed at demonstrating the dynamics of con-
formity in groups. He documented that norms compel indi-
viduals toward group conformity, even though in the simple 
experiment task, individuals determined the correct answer. 
Hence, to avoid being visibly different, many individuals 
succumbed to the conformity pressure to agree with the 
patently incorrect group consensus. A subsequent analysis of 
this experiment by Scheff (1990) associates Asch’s findings 
with the underlying emotional mechanisms. He maintains 
that the response occasioning the conformity was induced 
by shame, such that “the fear that they were suffering from 
a defect and that the study would disclose this defect” 
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Figure 1b. Emotional divergence
Note: Figures 1a and 1b are based on Damasio (2000), Ekman (1992), Mayer, Roberts, and Barsade (2008), Schwarz and Clore (1983), and Toynbee (1951).
(p. 90). On a grander scale, Janis’s (1982) groupthink 
phenomenon illustrates the disastrous consequences of 
these conformity pressures in group decision-making 
examples.
Whereas shame and fear do serve important functions 
(Solomon, 1993), in extreme forms they also play a vital role 
in the process of social ostracism. Specifically, individuals 
resisting organizational socialization rituals are sometimes 
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subject to certain disengagement power tactics; they are 
ignored or ostracized as nonconformists by colleagues or 
more senior members of staff wishing to enforce compli-
ance (Williams & Sommer, 1997). Consider, for example, 
the case of a young lawyer, who renewed his drinking habit 
after being ostracized by colleagues for stopping it. Realizing 
the detrimental consequences of such a habit, he eventually 
resigned and became a teacher (Frith, 2006).
Figure 1b, by comparison, highlights the divergent and 
adaptive characteristics of emotions, which provide vital 
action tendencies for individuals. Campbell-Sills, Barlow, 
Brown, and Hofmann (2006) agree, noting that the pursuit of 
meaningful life goals involves tolerance and regulation of a 
wide range of emotional states.
The potent value of Figures 1a and 1b manifests itself if 
one superimposes on the other. The convergent direction of 
the former and the divergent one of the latter stresses the 
potential conflict between both research strands. This analy-
sis has elicited the often-overlooked issue in EI studies that 
emotional and intellectual growth may not be synonymous 
with social or organizational growth and interests. In their 
original conception of EI, Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (1999) 
focus on internal emotions that are crucial for the individual 
as opposed to social growth. Therefore, the tapping into intra-
psychic experiences and the configuration of mental pro-
cesses may entail that individuals realize the detrimental 
ramifications of social conformity pressures, and undertake 
measures to safeguard their well-being (Lindebaum, 2009). 
My concern regarding the dysfunction of some social norms 
directly relates to this, and it has been a central tenet in this 
analysis that the emotionally intelligent individual is perhaps 
less susceptible to social conformity pressures at work. Under 
this formulation, positive deviance emanates from the indi-
vidual with a view to safeguarding his or her well-being, 
whereas negative deviance would be perceived by organiza-
tions, as individuals reject the prevailing norms that aim to 
serve organizational interests. Paradoxically, the perceived 
negative deviance from organizational norms may not be as 
negative as it might appear on the surface. Throughout, I have 
emphasized the central role of diversity in the evolution of 
human life. Therefore, deviance from dysfunctional norms 
not only can safeguard the well-being of individuals but also 
renders an invaluable service to organizations and society. 
One is reminded of Camus’s (1953/2000) argument that char-
acterizes rebellion as a real act of creation. In The Rebel, he 
posits that creation and revolution concern, in fact, only one 
issue: “the renaissance of civilization” (p. 237). Hence, “I 
rebel, therefore we exist” (p. 28). Camus’s argument can be 
translated into the organizational arena by way of the follow-
ing example. As stated earlier, recruitment problems and high 
turnover may be signs of deeper organizational problems 
resulting from the commodification of emotions. High turn-
over is particularly problematic in service industries, where 
poor well-being oftentimes has strong bearing on intentions 
to quit (Kumar Mishra & Bhatnagar, 2010). The need to 
address these problems may then result in organizational 
practices of commodifying emotions being abandoned in 
favor of other forms of managerial practice.
It can be deduced from the above discussion that there is a 
curvilinear relationship between social/organizational norms 
and (a) the extent to which they facilitate interpersonal rela-
tionships that can serve organizational and individual inter-
ests and (b) the extent of the tipping point where organizational 
interests may be in peril as high EI individuals seek to safe-
guard their well-being.
I suggest that high EI may account for the tipping point in 
the relationship. If we consider a continuum of minor acts of 
emotional commodification at work (i.e., occasional acts of 
feigning emotions to portray politeness to colleagues or cus-
tomers) to more substantive cases of commodified emotions 
(see Heuven & Bakker, 2003), I propose that the tipping point 
is situated at the juncture where individuals cannot exercise 
their creative individualism anymore. Beyond this, the real-
ization that their well-being would be compromised if being 
pushed further upward the continuum may further fuel their 
desire to resist the commodification of emotion—with all its 
negative health consequences—and potentially leave the 
organization. It shall be understood therefore, that Figure 2 
applies to individuals with high EI, and not low. Individuals 
less emotionally intelligent tend to be poorer at perceiving 
situational and emotional cues and can only draw on limited 
knowledge structures to guide their behavior (see Joseph & 
Newman, 2010). Hence, they may not be able to perceive the 
tipping point in time to prevent deteriorating well-being.
In a very real sense, the above tipping point represents a 
direct link to what has been called positive deviance, that is, 
departing from the norms of a given referent group in honor-
able ways (Spreitzer & Sonenshein, 2004)—honorable, how-
ever, in the sense of being positive for the individual (i.e., 
safeguarding one’s well-being), not for the organization in 
the short run. As suggested previously, absenteeism and high 
turnover may be symptoms of organizational decline or iner-
tia. In linking the content of Figures 1a and 1b with Figure 2, 
I suggest that the instance where the convergent tendency 
changes into the divergent one may be situated around the 
tipping point illustrated in Figure 2.
One would be, however, mistaken to accept the proposi-
tion of high EI individuals as nonconformists a priori. As 
theoretically pure and laudable such contemplation may 
appear, it shall be understood that individuals who, in many 
organizational contexts, openly express their emotions, face 
an overwhelmingly intricate problem; expressing a truly felt 
emotion at work is a delicate act—it can help sustain or 
destabilize the social order (Fineman, 2001). In this respect, 
Goffman (1963) cogently notes that “to be awkward or 
unkempt, to talk or move wrongly, is to be a dangerous 
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giant, a destroyer of worlds” (p. 81). Hence, being conspicu-
ously different can be a chancy undertaking. Yet, despite 
the earlier argument concerning individual benefits of not 
suppressing emotions, the roles of social actors often pre-
scribe it, especially when they are in the lower echelons of 
the organization. Ogbonna and Harris’s (2004) study on 
work intensification and emotional labor among U.K. 
university lecturers firmly underlines this point. In there, 
several lecturers bemoaned the imposition of undue 
administrative strain from more senior academics. In 
addition, they suggest that it is often seen as an act of pro-
fessionalism when individuals are able to maintain an orga-
nizationally appropriate emotional display (see also Stormer 
& Devine, 2008).
Future Directions
Having laid some theoretical groundwork, I propose several 
avenues for future research that could be incorporated in a 
rigorously designed longitudinal mixed-method study. First, 
I deem it intriguing to empirically test the curvilinear rela-
tionship highlighted in Figure 2. Of late, curvilinear relation-
ships have been identified as a priority area for future EI 
research (Jordan, Dasborough, Daus, & Ashkanasy, 2010). 
However, Jordan and colleagues theorize around EI (or par-
ticular branches of it) predicting outcome variables in a 
curvilinear fashion. I propose an extension to this thinking, 
namely, the consideration of curvilinear effects between dif-
ferent levels of analysis in management research. Multilevel 
analyses are a thriving component in this domain, especially 
for emotion researchers (Ashkanasy, 2003; Averill, 1992). 
However, rarely have the interstices of different levels of 
analysis been systematically examined. For instance, to 
center on individual emotion and organizational norms and 
their delicate interaction might reveal the interaction effect 
depicted in Figure 2. This constitutes an appropriate analogy 
to Scheff’s (1983) remark that what is human about human 
behavior oftentimes resided in the interaction between the 
inner and outer. Specifically, it is germane to empirically 
test whether high EI enables individuals to engage in cre-
ative individualism, so that individual and organizational 
goals can be facilitated, before individuals seek to safeguard 
their well-being. As elaborated earlier, this is the point when 
organizational interests may potentially be compromised 
due to high turnover and absenteeism. Research has shown 
that emotional well-being correlates negatively with turn-
over intentions (Kumar Mishra & Bhatnagar, 2010). In this 
respect, note that the current prevalent operationalization of 
ability EI in the form of the Mayer–Salovey–Caruso–
Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, Salovey, & 
Caruso, 2002) would appear unsuitable to empirically test the 
central thesis of this article. That is, can high EI be a catalyst 
for nonconformist behavior and make individuals leave or 
shun certain organizations in the first place? Underlying this 
is its susceptibility to measure social conformity (Matthews, 
Roberts, & Zeidner, 2004). To examine this thesis, future 
research could explore the utility of a recently developed 
ability EI measure (Blickle et al., 2009), which is based on 
target individuals’ responses to determine the correct 
answer of a test item. Precisely put, the correct answer is 
determined when the test taker selects the response actually 
reported by the target individual. The EI measure used 
would need to be coupled with measures of emotional 
labor, resistance tendencies, and well-being to fully address 
the proposition highlighted, bearing a curvilinear as opposed 
to linear effect in mind.
Facilitation of inter-personal  
relationships that can serve  
both organisational and  
individual interests 
Social and Organisational norms 
Harmless range  in which 
functional human interaction 
occurs–individuals may opt for 
creativeindividualismhere
Damaging range in which norms turn 
dysfunctional and high EI individuals 
resist the commodification of emotions
Failure to meet Organisational 
interests as high EI individuals seek
to safeguard their well-being Effect of 
high EI 
Figure 2. Curvilinear relationship between social norms and extent to which they facilitate or compromise organizational interests
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Furthermore, the issue of emotional and intellectual growth 
is inextricably relative in nature, as there are enduring indi-
vidual differences in emotion abilities (Ashkanasy, 2003). 
Therefore, the aforementioned quantitative examination 
would benefit from a subsequent longitudinal qualitative 
component, which has also been discussed as a much-needed 
avenue for future EI research organizations (Lindebaum & 
Cartwright, 2011). In so doing, the lived experiences of indi-
viduals in relation to commodified emotions at work and the 
meaning they append to it could be explored. The longitudi-
nal component would also enable the observation of, and 
exploration of rationales for, radical career changes that stem 
from intolerable frustration with past employers (Young & 
Rodgers, 1997). To further strengthen the rigor of such a 
study, the analysis of data emanating from the mixed-method 
study could be meaningfully used to single out those indi-
viduals who may exhibit such nonconformist behavior and 
place them in an experimental simulation. In the end, all that 
questionnaires permit is the prediction of behavior (i.e., the 
person “would do” that), but they cannot ascertain that the 
predicted behavior actually occurs. Experiments are often 
used to counter this argument (Brackett, Rivers, Shiffman, 
Lerner, & Salovey, 2006). With the aid of modern technol-
ogy (e.g., digital cameras to analyze propensity of emo-
tional suppression in faces), it would be possible to document 
the behavior that such individuals enact.
Conclusion
Solving the theoretical issues I identified in purely theoreti-
cal terms is a poor incentive for further study. I understand 
that the empirical exploration of my central thesis may prove 
challenging, especially in terms of methodology. Yet, such 
circumstance should not hinder us to tackle the advancement 
of theory and empirical testing in this woefully underex-
plored research area head-on. I hope that the synthesis of this 
analysis, in the form of the two templates (Figures 1a and 1b) 
and interaction model (Figure 2), sparks a new wave of more 
nuanced debates concerning the commodification of emo-
tions and EI at work. Compared with the major bulk of EI 
studies, deviant voices are sparse at best, especially EI’s 
potential for nonconformity in organizations.
Appendix
A striking and related depiction is featured in the recent movie 
The Island (2005). Although this is a fictitious example, 
Oatley (2009) reminds us that literary fiction reflects 
meaningful simulations of the mind. As such, they represent 
ideas that individuals “play with” to guide their behavior in 
everyday life. The movie’s storyline revolves around a her-
metically sealed top-secret facility in which human clones 
are reared as living repositories for affluent clients in the real 
world. If a client requires, for instance, a new liver, then the 
clone would have his or her liver removed. In this facility, 
sterility and healthy living are of paramount importance. 
Inhabitants of this facility are lured into the illusion that, by 
means of a lottery, they could be transferred to The Island, a 
paradise-like last pathogen-free location on earth. One inhab-
itant gets increasingly frustrated and angry about the lottery 
and who benefits from it (i.e., those supposedly benefiting 
from it are actually undergoing surgery to have their organs 
removed). One morning, he bangs his fist against the TV 
screen that displays a lottery advert. High-tech sensors pick 
up this “disturbance,” prompting two censors to remind him 
that these disturbances are unwanted in this facility, as high-
lighted in the excerpt below.
Just as the confrontation is over, a friendly computer 
voice reminds inhabitants of the following via loudspeaker 
announcement: “Remember to be polite, pleasant, and 
peaceful. A healthy person is a happy person.”
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